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Abstract
The number of district and municipality in Indonesia has been doubled within six
years. The local government is proliferated in the sense that they are multiplying in
such a short period. They were “only” bit more than 200 units when Suharto step
down in 1998, and doubled into 466 units in 2006. Interestingly, this took place in
an absence of definite plan, as the state shows its enthusiasm in decentralization
and bottom-up process of decision-making. This article aims to scrutinize this
phenomenon in order to understand the way identity politics evolve within the
process of decentralization, and the extent it responsible in explaining the
proliferation. In doing so, there are several point to make.
First, the state can no longer maintain its hegemonic role. During Sukarno and
Suharto leadership, state equipped itself with technocracy and bureaucracy to
ensure that it has effective control over its people as well as its agenda. Through
technocratically-equiped bureaucracy the state mobilisized certain kind of
discourse, which in turn defining what is deemmed proper to be done within the
banner of ethnic as well as religious solidarity. The state lost much of its coercive
capacity and ethnic and religious solidarity-making were virtually unconstrained
in shaping political landscape, not only at the local but also at the national level.
Discursive engagement presented in this study will figure out why that process
takes place.
Second, local elite plays critical role in the process of proliferation. Moreover,
they are in many cases even reverse their role. They previously are co-opted by the
state; but the they are co-opting back the state. Why is that so? The state are well
aware, and even too sensitive to, the potential of ethnic-based, race-motivated
conflict as well as secession potential (Wellman, 2005). Indeed, conflict did take
place quite extensively in Indonesia for that reason. The state chooses to
accommodate the interest of local elite, instead of confronting them which also
mean allowing the state to ruin. In other words, proliferation of local government
serves as strategy for preventing political disintegration. Local autonomy is the
best solution to ethnic conflict in Indonesia. (Bertrand, 2004).
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2Third, the proliferation of local government confirms the importance of
territoriality or territorial attachment (Kahler and Walter, 2006). Territory serve
as basis for identity politic. By establishing new set of local governments, the
central government still retains territorial control and at the same time local
activists also have opportunity to do so.
Up to recently, the idea of nation state—namely one state contains one nationhood—was
intensely inspiring institutional design state all over the world. Term ‘national’ typically
implies coverage as extentsive as the territory of a particular state. There are various kind
of nationalism: ethno-nationalism, religio-nationalism and so on. Nonetheless, only one
type of nationhood really fit to the need of the state, that is the statewide nationhood.
Missmatch of national sentiment of the authority of state generates problem of either
secession or demand for integrating partial territory of two separate states.
The salience of identity politics poses difficulty in sustaining the idea of nation state. More
over, we can no longer expect state keep trying to manage if not manipulate changing in of
nationhood. State is deemed necessary to engage in a process of self-transformation to
contain the prevail of identity politics. In line with this necessity, Indonesia witnesses the
proliferation of the local governments in response to the rising demand for recognition of
local interests and identities.
Prior to examine Indonesian case, it is important to note that what at stake here is
institutional design of a state. In order to avoid missjudge what happening in Indonesia it is
worthwhile to make a close look at the fundamental design: nation state. Uncovering the
flaw of nation state would lead to a carefull analysis on Indonesian affairs.
Coming to Terms With Nation State
In order proportionally comprehent extent Indonesia is in troubleto perform as a nation
state, we need to set a clear idea of the feature what a nation state really is. There two
separate idea: ‘state’ and ‘nation’. We need to clarify these two concepts.
Let be clear what a state really means. Since agreement on exact defition of state has not
been possible,2 the easiest way to grasp the idea is by identifyng formal characteristic
instrinsic to the state. Andrew Vincent descriotion is worthy to quote despite a bit too long.
It has a geographically identifieable territory with a body of citizens. It
claims authority over all citizens and groups within its boundaries and
embodies more comprehensive aims than other association. The authority of
the state is legal in character and is usually seen as the source of law. It is
2Andrew Vincent, “Conceptions of the State” in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.),
Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Routledge, London 1992. See also John Hoffman, Beyond the
State, Polity Press, Oxford, 1995.
3based on procedural rules which have more general recognition in society
than other rules. The procedure of the states are operated by trained
bureaucraies of office holders. The state also embodies the maximum
control of resourcess and force within a territory. Its monopoly is not simply
premised on force: most states try to claim legitimacy for such monopoly,
namely, they seek recognition and acceptance from the population. In
consequence, to be member of state implies a civil disposition. Further, the
state is seen as sovereign, both in internal sense within territory, and in an
external sense, namely, the state is recognized by other state as an equal
member on international society. It should be note, however, that the idea of
the state change with different sense of sovereignty. Finally,  the state as a
continuous public power distinct from rulers and ruled.3
In describing state, Vincent does not implies nationhood or nationalisme as a pre-
requirement of the existence of a state. He, however, mention ‘citizen’, ‘population,’
‘group,’ ‘society’ or ‘other association’, as the subject of a state. How can we differentiate
them from the state ? The striking different is that the state has a legitimate monopoly in
the use of force. What make ‘citizen’, ‘population,’ ‘group,’ ‘society’ or ‘other association’
unite togather ? There many uniting factors at work to allow a state be more
comprehenvise than any other association. They are set of procedure, law, bureaucracy and
so on.
What is nation then ? A nation is a kind of uniting sentiment. It could “merely” a shared
imagination of being a community. The uniting capacity of nationhood could lead to
various process: territorial integration, freedom of political association, cultural survival,
popular sovereignth under a liberal dan democratic constitution or even ethnic
segregation.4 The idea of nation does not presuppose the existence of a state. Max Weber,
however, suggest that the idea of nation tend to be associated with the idea of state. By
quoting Weber, Gilber suggests that “A nation is a community of sentiment which would
adequately manifest itself in a state of its own: hence a nation is a community which
normally tends to produce a state of its own”5. He even treats “a nation as a group of
people wishing to associate in the same state.6 The mobilization of sentiment for enhancing
nationhood is called nationalism.
Nation state essentially is the meeting point between nationhood and statehood. The idea of
nation state implies optimism that they both compatible and even mutually enforcing.
Nationalism, for those who are sympatethic the nation state, would enhance state building.
The idea of nation state implies that state is the best set up to contain nationhood. It even
3Ibid. p. 44.
4Paul Gilbert, The Philosophy of Nationalism, Westview Press, Boulder Corolado, 1998, p. 8.
5Ibid. p. 14-15.
6Ibid. p. 90.Italic from its original.
4makes nationhood functional by the way easing state in performing its normative
duties.This is not always the case.
In some other case, nation-state is an akwardmixture. This means, the existance and the
functioning of nation state entails a number of prerequisites. It existence is either supported
by a strong sense of citizenship or effective state control. The prevailing civic culture
allows not only the florishing of strong sense of citizenship. It in fact supersede ethno-
nationalistic sentiment. Citizenship, which essentially is a pillar for liberal democracy,
allow Western Europe to survive liberal political system democratically. Otherwise, they
have to follow the path of their fellow counterpart in Eastern Europe: leaving national
sentiment to the state.
In this regard it is important to none that, despite the diversity of the meaning of
democracy, Indonesia bound follow suit institutional set up the former colonial state:
liberal democracy.7 The notion state, within the framework of liberal democracy,
presupposes the existence of citizen within strong sense of citizenship.
State is an institutional set up, within which daily politics is shaped. As an institutional set
up, the idea of national state was not easily institutionalized. This implies that decision
making and institutional building within the country is bound to fail as its foundation—the
idea of nation state—happened to be shaky and slippery. Indonensia as a nation state is in
trouble beacause of the difficulty in—if it was serious enough to bringing it about—the
whole idea nation state. Unfinished process of nation building, namely process of creating
new and uniting various facet of collective identities, exacerbates problem sharing and
distributive justice. Instead of performing its normative role, namely to alllocate value
before its people in authoritative way8, the state is conquered by its people on the name of
democracy, and severely obstruct in performing policy-making process on the name of
representing collective identity.
The idea of nation state is rooted in European history. Nationalism is important ingredient
in mobilizing popular support for winning conflict among social layers and factions.9 It
actually has dual faces: externally fragmenting and internally uniting. By establising a
nation state, nationwide nationhood then become the most important uniting power. The
7Immediately after its Independence, Indonesia engage in an experiment to to put into practice the idea of
liberal democracy. Unable to take this seriusly, President Sukarno decided to replace with the so-called
Guided Democracy. The basic idea of Guided Democracy was retained by President Suharto. The basis idea
is that the president take a a full control of the political process and even the political system in rest on the
leaders’ decision as oppose to dialectice of various force. Even though the term ‘guided democracy’ was
invested by Sukarno, it was President Suharto who manage to practice in the real term. Unlike Sukarno who
was very limited room for asserting leadership, Suharto enjoyed much more room for establishing control.
Why is what so ? Sukarno was stuck in between, and hence bound to balance the two opposing major
forces—the communist and the military. Suharto secure effective control because he successfull in eradicting
communist power.
8David Easton, Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Clift, New Jersey, 1965.
9Mikuláš Teich and Roy Porter (eds.), The Natinal Question in Europe In Historical Context, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
5idea of democratic state, in this regard implies the nationwide nationhood as the fix size of
the state.
Even in West Europe country itself, establishing democracy has not been easy. Blending
various kind of religious and ethnic-based nationalis into new short of nationalism which is
known as civil nationalism is an ambitious project. This especially so in plural society,
whithin which there are more than one deeprooted nationhood to exist as functional in
asserting public power.Developing democracy within the frame of nation state face severy
difficulty. For this reason Arend Lijphrart offers consociational democracy,10 which takes
nationalism seriously, as oppose to procedural democracy which assume that national
sentiment is replaceble by citizenship. Political representation is build along national
divide, as oppose to political parties affiliation. Apart from difficulties entails in the idea, it
nonetheless was chosen as institutional template of virtually any state in Europe. This was
true up until a number of states in that region agree to blend their nation state in to a “new
kind” of state: European Union.
In response to akward mixture of statehood and nationhood a number of states in European
countries engage in a process of self-transformation. It is certainly also those due to the
akward those mixture other state like Indonesia seeks to transform itself, despite into
different direction. For European, one state was not big enough to containe their
nationhood. They are longing for larger state, and for that reason they unite the territories
of each state into through an extensive territorial integration.
For Indonesian, on the other hand, one state has been too difficult to govern. Indonesia, as
a country which endowed extremely high cultural diversity, is prone to conflict.  Each
socio-cultural and religious bond asserts its identity and at previously predominating
governement engaging in administrative reform to preserve the authority of the nation
state. In the pluralist society like Indonesia, there are surely numeros facet of nationalism
to exist. They exist much-much earlier than the state itself, and hence the post colonial like
Indonesia face a huge task to deal with.11
Parallel to what we are witnessing in Europe, Indonesia unable to sustain the existing form
of nation state. It has been engaging in the process of self-transformation with one
condition: keeping the state as one entity. For most Indonesian, letting the state to break up
is unbearable. The state transform itself by engaging in dramatic process of
decentralization. The state, which was highly centralized during many decades of the New
Order’s authoritarian rule, suddently engage in massive scale of decentralized.
Authoritarian cum centralised rule has been responsible massive conflict and violent in
10Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, New
Haven, 1977.
11Greg Barton, “Issues Concerning Democracy and Citizenship in Indonesia” in Andrew Vandenberg (ed.),
Citizenship and Democracy in A Global Era, MacMillan Press, 2000.
6some parts of the coutry, as well as potential  break up of the state.12 Repressive excercised
by the corrupt state has been symtom of its weakness in governing its huge and differs
commutity.13 There has been strong hope that despite much more difficult to carry out,
decentralized system would prevent the state to break up.14
In coming to term with the idea of nation state, Indonesian inevitably need to be sensitive
to its socio-cultural context. The state evolves in such a way resemble to Lijphart’s idea of
consociational politics. Primordial affiliation has never been officially declared as a basis
for political recruitment, yet bureaucracy and the military has been informally use is as a
refference in maintaining ethnic  distribution within it. In a way bureaucracy serves as
representative institution, otherwise the state is prone to conflict. Distribution of cabinet
seat always, no matter who is the president, always take ethnic dan religious distribution
seriously. If bureaucracy serves representative mission, what happen with political parties
then ? The power basis of each political political party are resemble to primordial affiation
or spatial distribution. Each political parties has its own stronghold. For example,
Abdulrahman Wahid’s party, namely Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, would always win in
east Java, and Amien Rais’s party—Partai Amanat Nasional—would win in the area
where urban-based Islamic Organization (Muhammadiyah) gained local influence. This
political party would have limited support from Baliness which mostly are Hindus.
Obviously, Indonesia does has political party as a medium for peoples representation. Yet,
political party’s affiliation is neither based on what the party’s platform or commitment.
Affiliation, instead, is depend of the identity of the party. Observers on Indonesian politics
call this phenomena as politik aliran, to suggest that political behavious is set by affiliation
to particular grouping.
Those anecdotal evidents should be sufficient to suggest that, apart from national
nationalism, there are sub-national nationalism. The uniting power of the sub-national
nationalism could be territorial attachment, ethnic grouping or religious affiliation. The
sub-national nationalism unites less than the total of Indonesian population, indeed. It
nonetheless is more authentic or natural than the factually nationalwide or the “wider”
nationalism. The latter, in essence is, made-up by the state within its its desperate attept to
unite the entire population in the country into a new collective identity, to resemble the
idea of civic nationalism. The newly constructed collective identity so far has not been
able replace the authentic or natural nationalism. People could be nationalist according the
state’s term, and at the same time also considerate to ethnic or religious nationalism.
12Syamsul Hadi et. al. (eds.), Disintegrasi Pasca Orde Baru: Negara, Konflik Lokal dan Dinamika
International, Centre for International Relation Studies (CIReS) FISIP UI bekerjasama dengan Yayasan Obor
Indonesia, Jakarta 2007.
13Nono Anwar Makarim, “Pemerintahan yang Lemah dan Konflik”, in Dewi Fortuna Anwer et. al. (eds.),
Konflik Kekerasan Internal: Tinjauan Sejarah, Ekonomi-Politik, dan Kebijakan di Asia Pasifik, Yayasan
Obor Indonesia, LIPI. LASEMA-CNRS, KITLV-Jakarta, Jakarta 2005.
14Indra J. Pilliang et. al (eds.), Otonomi Daerah: Evaluasi & Proyeksi, Yayasan Harkat Bangsa bekerjasama
dengan Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, Jakarta 2003. See also series of Indonesia Rapid
Decentralization Appraisal conducted by The Asia Foundation since 2001.
7The new breed of nationalism—or civil nationalism so to speak—is meant to be the basis
for governing the state. But there was also the rival idea, religious nationalism is the basis
for setting up the state. Since the early period of post-independent, there was strong desire
of establishing Islamic state. In response to this desire, the state has been typically
troubled. This trigered a number of Islamic leader to promote a breakthough, namely to
accommodate the process of instituinalizing Islamic values in public life (such as banking,
schooling and so on) but at the same time retaining the principle that the state is impartial
in terms legal rules. In other words, the state let Islam to flourish as practical point of
refference for moslems, but at the same time contains it as nationhood or collective
identity.
Globalization sweep both Indonesian and the Europe. It allows a dual change to take place.
Nation states inevitably have to engage in both convergence as well as divergence changes
in response to the mounting intensity of globalization.15
Indonesia’s current history reveals the fact that, from time to time, either statehood or
nationhood is bound to change in order to maintain political order.16 It has been working
hard, and yet hardly acccomplish its original mission, in transforming itself in to a nation
state.17 The difficulty not only stem the complexity of Indonesian society but also from the
very idea of nation state.
A sound foundation and exact recipe for transforming Indonesia as a nation state is
unavailable. Indonesis keeps experimenting with itself and in doing so it has great
difficulty in learning from its history. The direction for change, to some extent, is shape by
the sense of crisis. The point here is that, crisis leave ample space of redical policy
changes, but inability to implement fundamental policy eventually self-transforming of the
state, leave the country indismay. To make it more complicated, the transformation is
overshadowed by liberal thought which typically have no confidence in the instrumentality
of the state. The liberal lays down sets of principles such as authonomy, rights,
participation and so forth. Transformation process along with this principles woul leace
Indonesian reconstruct the state in an absent of blue print, unless they are competent and
committed to some sort of collective designing.
Transforming the state is difficult to imagine, given the contradiction it entails. The very
idea of state implies the operation of four vital issue—monopoly, legitimacy, territory and
force—which, as Hoffman suggests, entails serious tension, if not contradiction among
themselve.18 In slighly different tone, Paddison (by reffering to Binder et al.) identifies five
15Nanang Indra Kurniawan, “Masyarakat Dunia, Globalisasi dan Nation-State”, in Nanag Pamuji Mugasejati
and Ucu Martanto (eds.), Kritik Globalisasi & Neolberalisme, FISIPOL UGM, Yogyakarta, 2006.
16Anhar Gonggong, “Bangsa-Negara Indonesia; Bentuk Negara dan Sistem Demokrasi yang Berubah-ubah
dalam Krisis”, Jurnal Politika, Volume 1, No. 3 Desember 2005.
17Faruk, “Imajinasi, Reimajinasi, dan Deimajinasi: Soal Negara-Bangsa dan Kita”, Th Sumartana et. al,
(eds.), Nasionalisme Etnisitas: Pertaruhan Sebuah Wacana Kebangsaan, Institut DIAN/Interfidei,
Yogyakarta, 2001
18John Hoffman, Beyond the State, Polity Press, Oxford, 1995.
8problems area each state has to encounter. They are: (1) identity, (2) legitimacy, (3)
participation, (4) penetration, dan (5) distribution. They are interrelated, as Figure 1 shows,
but the core of the problem is legitimacy.19
For Paddison, identity is a matter of mutual sentimens by members of a territorial group
towards government. There national as well as sub-national identities. The existence of
nation state create problem of national identity, depending on they relate each other. It is
problematic when sub-national identity serves more as competitor rather than
complementing national identity. For him legitimacy is a matter of acceptance of
government decisions because of the ‘rightness’ by which they are derived. State
legitimacy if the rightness of its decisions is constantly questioned by its subjects.
Participation is about who contributes to decision making process. The absence of
participation make the decision either inacurate and unacceptable. The other problem,
namely penetration, refers to effectiveness of government control. The last but not least is
the problem of distribution. For Paddison, it is about the extent to which decisions
distribute/redistribute material benefits within society.20
Other scholars offer another dimension to look at. In this regard, Stephan Leibfried and
Michael Zürn propose an interesting idea. They identify four dimensions which alltogather
represent the essential of a state. Those four are: resource, legality, legitimacy and welfare.
The salience of resource dimension lead to construction of modern territorial state. The
question on legality of state raises the issue of law and sovereingnth, meanwhile the sought
of legitimacy has been anchored the state at the idea of democratic nation state, and the
19Ronan Paddison, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power, Basil Blackwel, Oxford, 1983.
20Ibid. page 9.
identity participation
distributionpenetration
legitimation
Figure 1:
Interrelation between the problem areas
Source:Paddison, 1983
9quest for the welfare lead to debate on wheter the state should be interventionist or leave
the matter to the market. The manifestation of those four dimensions brought to the fore
four interrelates issue: Territorial State, Rule of Law, Democratic State and Intervention
State. They put all the fours issue into a simple abbreviation: TRUDI.21 Four them, the
dynamic of state’s reform is detectable in their way to deal with territorial issue, rule of
law, democracy and state intervention. By combining those fours dimension
simultaneously the specify eight potentials direction of change. They are, as Table 1
shows: (1) localization, (2) liberalization (deregulation), (3) transnationalization, (4)
regionalization, (5) internationalization, (6) fragmentation, (7) socialization and (8)
supranationalization.
Where does state transformation in Indonesia lead to ? Analytical tools developed by
Leibfried and Zürn would be useful in uncovering what has been happening. Unlike the
reform in OECDs countries which outward looking, transformation process in Indonesia
basically is inward looking. Wherever the change lead to, it is neither transnationalization,
internationalization nor supranationalization.  Special attention to dynamic at sub-national
level would direct us to foresee either localization, regionalization or fragmentation.
Proliferation of Local Governments
States, as member of international community, is proliferating. It does responding to
structural changes. It is therefore not so surprising to see that local government is
21Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn (eds.), Transformtion of the State ?, Cabridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2005.
Table 1: Change in TRUDI
TERRITORIAL CHANGE
Subnationalization Status Quo Ante Internationalization
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Status Quo
Ante Regionalization
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nationalization
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Expansion Fragmentation
Socialization
(National-
ization)
Supra-nationalization
Source: Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn, 2005.
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proliferating as well. At issue here is how does it come about ? If we agree Leibfried and
Zürn, it certainly has to do with the problem of resource, legality, legitimacy and welfare.22
For Paddison, it is a matter of identity, participation, legitimacy, penetration and
distribution. While for Hoffman,  it is a matter of monopoly, legitimacy, territory and
force. These ideas basically refers to the same thing: state as organised power. They all
emphasize the importance of securing legitimacy. In this section, with make the best use of
those idea in uncovering how the proliferation of local governments in Indonesia.
We all know that as Republic of Indonesia, along with many other states, was born during
decolonization which took place at the end of World War II. There was a wave of the
emergence of new states, thank to the changing nature of post World War.23These new
born state practically has nothing. Judging by problems area mapped by the criteria set out
by Paddison, Indonesia as the newly-born state encountered severe problems on all the
five: identity, participation, legitimacy, penetration and distribution.
The Identity which unites Indonesia as a nation had been sharing misery in the past,
sharing experience on living under colonial rule. Well, the territory of the state is the
former Dutch colonial empire. At that period, Indonesian were united under the banner of
Indonesian citizenship, since the state itself endowed with very limited capacity to
penetrate the society. Not only the capacity to distribute was limited, there were not
enough good and service to be distributed.
In response to those problems, President Sukarno embarked on the process of nation-
building. The first thing he did was to construct new identity, namely to a member of
newly established state. He was well aware that nationhood was critical issue and therefore
deserve a priority. Nationhood, in this regard was the subject to leadership manipulation in
order to ensure the newly-born state qualified to be a nation state. Given the importance of
the nationalism for uniting all Indonesian in one bond, the state inevitable mobilize
national symbols, anthem and as well as mobize its discousive capacity along that line. At
issue here was the existance and the functionong of national identity. In context, the state
come up with simple but smart formula: bhinneka tunggal ika [unity in diversity]. Each
individual and group deserve to have their own identity, but such an identity shall not
undermine state-promoted identity.
The territory which was as wide as Europe altogether was devide into several provinces,
and dosen of privinces not long after that. By 1957, precisely during the 17th anniversary of
Indonesia’s indipendence, President Sukarno launched Central Kalimantan as the 17th
province. A number of provinces was established in the 1950s. Within this period, a
number of local-level rebellion took place. This indicated that state failed to satisfy the
22Ibid.
23The founding of new state, from a legal-administrative point of view, was the result of internal struggle.
The fuct that there was a wave of proliferation indicates that there were structural forcess at work to make
happen. The fact was that, decolonization was at the top of international agenda. More over, no matter how
holtile the newly-born states to their colonial master, their aspiration is to be the same the colonial master, to
have a nation state of their own.
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local demand a fair distribution of welfare (good and servicess). At some cases, the
rebellion was stem from the central government failure in dealing with religious identity,
and hence allowing to mobilization of religious sentiment to challenge the state.
The proliferation of provincial government took place from time to time at a slow pace,
and within each province—especially in the outer islands—new regencies and municipality
were proliferating. These process marked the attemp improve the penetrating capacity of
the state. Presumably, the more the local governments Indonesia has the deeper—in both
geographical and sociological senses—the state has a capacity to reach its citizen, as well
as its resourcess.
The number of local government was kept at almost stagnant during the period of New
Order government (1967-1998). West Papua joined Indonesia as the 26th province and East
Timor was the 27th. In order to improve state’s penetrating capacity, West Papua Province
was established not long before the New Order period was over.
The process of nation building was far from complete when Suharto took over Presidency
from Sukarno. New common identity of Indonesian was not well establish yet, marked by
tension between nationalist, religious and the communit. Sukarno seeked to united them by
keeping their political role in balance, and called the three in an interesting acronim:
NASAKOM.  Yet, President Suharto come up with different idea. Suharto was obsessed
with pragmatic approach in governaning the country. He assumes that sub-national
nationalism which ideaological in nature is replaceable to material incentive: economis
welfare. He prepared to disregard uniqueness of local context and socio-cultural diversity,
and even relied on authoritarian rule which work within a sentralistic mode of governance.
Pragmatic approach arguably was important for fulfiling his promises, namely to bring
about economic-oriented development. In this regard, the state was presented as rational
and unproblematic instrumen for achieving predetermined pragmatic goals. Identity
politics which gained prominence during Sukaro’s period, was replaced with public
administration. In response to the prevailing sub-national nationalism, he engineered the
society by the way of uprooting organisational bases of political parties which strife to
mobilise religious identity and at the same time created Golongan Karya as pragmatic and
catch all political party as alternative.
Proliferation of local government was not the on the priority of public agenda during the
New Order Period. This does not necessarily imply that the state has already an effective
instrument to reach its subject. Indeed, proliferation of local government was legally
viable.24But if was saveguarded by serius arrangement process, not merely by producing
writen evident to indicate the feasibility to do so. There were steps to follow, including to
upgrade to condition of the would be new entity of local government serving a transitory
24See Act No. 5 of 1974 on Government at the Local Level, as well as Act No. 5 of 1979 on Grassroots Level
of Government.
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role. Approval to set up new entity of local government was based on real evidence—as
oppose to feasibility study. Once the approval is granted, the new unit is ready to function.
The leverage of the state to its subject was sought through bureaucratic reform which
incorporate territorial reform within it. This apparent from the way each level of
government were set up. Act No. 5 of 1975 specify hierarchy of local governments. There
were two layers of autonomous local government: First Level of Autonomous Government
(Daerah Tingkat I) and the Second Level of Autonomous Government (Daerah Tingkat
II). At the same time there were four layers of field offices of central government. They
were cosecutively lead by Governor and the Regent/Mayor. The two layers of
autonomopus government were superimposed by the first two field office of the central
government so that, the Governor also the Head of the Fist Level of Local Government and
the Regent/Mayor is the Head of /second Level of Autonomous Government.  The other
two levels of field office of central government were Sub-Distric Goverment and Hamlet.
The Head of Sub-Distric was responsible for the Regent/Mayor, and the Head of Hamlet is
responsible to the Head of Sub-District.
What those arrangement tells us ? The New Order state relies of chain of command of its
bureaucry to both delivering public services as well as receiving input from its subject.
Local autonomy was marginalised through the the ganting of dual status of Head of the
First Level as well as the Head of Second Level of local goernment. They serves more as
the agent of the central government rather than as the leader of authonomous local
government. This was the institutional set up designed to allow central gevernment to
penetrate the entire region. In order to ensure penetration to grassroot level, Act No. 5 of
1979 imposes Java-like bureaucracy throughout the country. The Act appeared to be
insenstive to cultural and geographical diversity which so far allowed result in the the
disregard to the uniqueness and local-specific nature of rural or grassroots level of
government.
For President Suharto, authoritarian rule is prerequisite for allowing the stake take control
over resources available for achieving prosperity for the entire Indonesian. He,
unfortunately unable to guarantee that state bureaucracy and technocracy are reliable
instrument for achieving people’s properity. Regretably, state’s capacity to regulate the use
of natural resourcess as well as it’s capacity to distribute the wealth for the entire
Indonesian was poor.25 Massive extraction of natural resourcess has indeed resulted in
economic growth, yet the wealh was unevenly distributed.
Despite its overall success in bringing about material welfare to its people, there were
structural problem awaiting to explose. The way the state work created problem of
legitimacy. Concentration of power produces contrentation of wealth. Most of rupiah in
Indonesia is circulated within the capitol city of Jakarta and its surrounding, impliying that
25Purwo Santoso, The Politics of Environmental Policy-making in Indonesia: A Study od State’s Capacity,
1967-1994, Ph.D Thesis, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science,
1999.
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the money goes along with the state power. While the local are deprived access to natural
resourcess, the central failed to redistribute.
The New Order well aware of the importance of decentralization. The Act No. 4 of 1974
clearly state that the emphasis in local authonomy shall be developed at the Second Level
of Autonomous Government. This indicated the understanding of the importance to give
more autonomy to the lovest level of local governments. The problems though laid at its
implementation. The central government was to slow and seems even reluctant to
decentralize its authority, given its centralistic nature of its institutional arrangement.
The intention to give more autonomu at the second level of local governments, at the same
time, revealed reluctance to give autonomy to the First Level of Local Governments. Why
is that so ?Because The First Level of Local Governments take up territory which was
wide enough to set an independent state. Bear in mind, their size were equivalent to that of
each state in Europe. To three secession movements took place at provincial level: Aceh,
Papua and East Timor.
The way Suharto lead the country, to a large extent, inconsistent with, if not contradictory
to, the global trend which inclined to work along with liberal line. Sporadic adaptation to
match with such trend was made, yet it was not far enough. Dissappointment were
eventually transform into explosion of public anger and the state was stuck in crisis of
legitimacy. Monetary crisis was transformed into financial and then economic crisis, and it
end up with political crisis. President Suharto appeared to have no more legitimacy to rule
the country, and hence decided to step down in 1998. This event marked the beginning of
massive transformation of the state in the period to come. Low level—if not the absence—
of legitimacy on part of the state was exacerbated by the lack of condence of state-based
indenity established earlier on. The agenda reform [known in Indonesia as reformasi] was
threatened to loose its direction as the state was increasingly fragmented. The state no
longer take control because, in the mind of the reform-movement activist, the problem is
the state itself.
The use of force by the military-dominated government to assert monopoly of resource and
discourse was deemed necessity. Authoritarian rule, as oppose to right-based liberal
governance, appeared to be as the best choice allowing the state to exist and functioning.
Moreover, authoritarian rule was taken as the price that the government have to pay
ensuring scenario of state-led prosess of economic-based development to take place. It was
widely assumed that, the legitimacy of the state is primarily rest on its ability to deliver
prosperity to its people. The ability of President Suharto to keep in power for a period of
more that three decades was explained by its mobilizing a common belief that state is a
trouble-free intrument for serving the interest of all Indonesian, and at the at the same time
suppres disenting view that state in fact is the rulers’ instrument .
The change of the state in the aftermath of authoritarian and centralised rule under Suharto
is important to scrutize. This article aims to uncovering what has been on going so far. In
doing so, the author Indonesia not as an entirely unique case, due to the fact that it shares
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with other country the same external drive for internal change. Suharto’s step down
represented the Indonesia incapacity to resist the demand for desmantling authoritarianism
as well as the necessity for engaging in the process of establishing democratic state.
Massive Proriferation
The absence of the legitimacy of Suhato’s leadership leave him no choice but to step down,
after more than three decades leading the country. The absence of strong and effective
leadership in dealing with deep rooted problem of governance in the country has allowed
massive violent to take place.26 This marked the second cycles of bloody sucession in
Indonesia. The first took place prior to Sukarno’s step down, just before Suharto step in the
presidency. The intensity and the scale of conflict and violent since 1998 has resulted in
the mounting pressure for institutional transformation.27
In this regard the newly elected member of the House of Representatives and People’s
Consultative Assembly begun to launch radical process oftransformation. The locus of
policy making largely shifted from bureaucracy to politician at the parliament. The well-
trained bureaucrats or technocrats who usually responsible in policy-making lose their
confidence. They no longer insistence on policy ideas they have and chose to adopt ‘wait
and see’ strategy instead. The idea of control, to some extent, has been replace with
participation.
Within less than a year newly drafted Act—which aimed at swinging the pendulum format
of local government to the other end—was enacted.  It was known as Act No. 22 of 1999.
In the occasion of Constitution Amandment in the following years, state’s obligation the
engaged in the widest possible local autonomy was put in place. A number of modification
of that Act was made through enactment of Act No. 32 of 2004. The Act and the
constitutional mandate specifies the rules to guide transformation toward a more
democratic as well as more decentralized governance. There has been widespread belief
that decentralization is required to calm local discontent. The granting of special otonomy
to two troubled provinces—Aceh and Papua—was meant to end problem of secession.28
With regard to territorial refom, the new Act namely Act No. 22 of 1999 on local
government drived a completely different political dynamic. It actually retains old and
plain rule in that local government could be spit as well as to beamalgamated. The
procedure to grant a status as new entity of local government was eased. First, initiatives
should came from the local people and government. This rule set up a new frame that local
are responsible in designing their own local government. Second there is no longer requires
26Gerry Van Klinken, “Pelaku Baru, Identitas Baru: Kekerasan Antar Suku pada Masa Pasca Soeharto di
Indonesia” dalam Dewi Fortuna Anwar et. al. (eds.), Op. cit. pages 91-116. See also Jaques Bertrand,
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
27Bertrand, ibid.
28Agus Sumule (ed.), Mencari Jalan Tengah: Otonomi Khusus Propinsi Papua, Gramedia, Jakarta, 2003.
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actual preparation in the form of transitory status for the would be new entity of local
government. As far as the proposal for establishing new entity of local government is
provided with adequate feasibility analysis, it could be easily granted. Third, the initiator
could use either executive or legislature channels. Traditionally This is because central
government grants new entity of local government through an Act. This imply that the
approval of establishing new entity of government subject to approval from both House of
Representative as well as the President. For some reasons, politicians in the House of
Representative are more accommodative to the proliferation of local governments,
meanwhile the president and its bureaucracy tend to minimize political huzzle made by
politician. Eventually, more and more proposal for establishing new local government
proceeds through legislature channel.29
Act No. 22 of 1999 was replaced by Act No. 32 of 2004. In term of the split and
amalgamation of local government it retained the point mention in Act of 22 of 1999.
Hence it did not change the existing trend. Judging from the logic lays behind the scheme
of establishing new local government, it appears that they both oriented both at pleasing
the local. The way the policy-making works is practically the same to lincensing scheme.
Policy-making process within this scheme apparently has been reduce to procedure for
obtaining license, namely license to have a new set of local government. It this regard,
there has been neither grand strategy nor maximun number of local governments that
Indonesia ought to have.
President Suharto lived his presidency in 1998 with 27 provinces and some 225
Regencies/Municipalities. By Juli 2007 the number of provincial Indonesia has addition 8
provinces. They are the provinces of Banten, Bangka Belitung, Riau Archipelago, West
Irian Jaya, Gorontalo, Souteast Maluku, West Sulawesi. Meanwhile there are 21 proposal
awaiting of parliamentary debate, leading to the establishment of yet another provincial
government. The feature of the ploriferation of regency and municipalities are even more
impresive. The figure has increased from 225 to 570 units within a period of less than a
decade. This, nonetheless has not exhaust other proposal fron having additional new
regencies and municipalities.
Identity Politics
The previous section revealed the setting in which proliferation of local government took
has been taking place. This section offers interpretation as to why it happens in the way it
happens. The first part will identify the changing of opportunity structure within which
proliferation of local governments appear to be favourable (in not the best option). The
second part describes typical ways dan strategy employed by the involving parties to gain a
29This statement was revealed by Dr. Ngadisah, Head of Research and Development, Ministry of Home
Affairs, during discussion at Salatiga, 19 Juli 2007.
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new entity of local government.The preferent to proliferation of local governments and the
way to gain the preference, to some extents, are framed by the prevalence of identity
politics within the country.
1. The Changing of Opportunity Structure.
Description in the previous section indicated the adding up of local government entities as
a measure of equiping the state with instrument to govern and serving its subjects. It
indedd took place from time to time. It differs only in terms of pace, instead of
occurence.30 The changing of the pace, is supposedly structured by the changing of
opportunities left by the dynamic within of state-society relationship. The root of the
structural change, in this regard is it the changing nature as well as character of
governance, i.e; the way the state interrelate with the society.
There was attept to contruct state-soceity relationship within a framework of nation state.
As the previous section indicated historical changing has lead nation state to tranform itself
into various direction. This is due to the diference in emphasize, if not competition
between, state-building (to enhance statehood) and nation-building (to enhance
nationhood). This apparently true in Indonesian case. During its early independence, the
state putting emphasize on nation building envisioned by President Sukarno. This,
however, does not means that there was no need for state building. Wice President,
Muhammat Hatta, actually envisioned state building instead.31 There was a strong need to
have much more local governments, but the state was severly constrained by the
availability of resources. When Tjilik Riwut, the local hero of Central Kalimantan prepare
the establishment of the capitol for the Province of Central Kalimantan in the 1950s, the
other local leader were laught at him. Why was that so? Because he start building the
capitol in the middle of a jungle, and yet the money was not available. As time goes by, the
copitol is now known as the Municipality of Palangkaraya. The point I want to make here
is that, systematic measures for state building would be extremely expensive and the
money was not there. Yet, the alternative, i.e; nation building, was not only much cheaper
but still serve a strategic purpose.
Engaging in national building, in essence, is developing a new identity as citizen of the
newly established independent state. For this purpose, the state and particularly President
Sukarno, engage in numerous and meticulous social engineering. He sought common
denominators which unites various enthic group and religious affilliation which were
scattered thught out a huge territory of the state. The most genious measure was the setting
30Further more, this analysis is not question the total number of local governments, despite the fact it
risespublic concern already.
31Rocky Gerung, “Globalisasi, Etnisitas dan Tantangan Konsep Nasionalisme”, in Th. Sumartana et. al.
(eds.), Nasionalisme Etnisitas …, op. cit., page15.
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up the state’s ideology: Panca Sila (the Five Principle).32 By doing so he demonstrated that
the nation state his venture in national building lead to strengthning the base up which state
building process departed.
Adding up more local governments, as Indonesian current history reveals, was a
trickyissue. The commitment to efficiency and other considerations has led Sukarno to
Achehness Moslem and Batakees Christian into one unit of provincial government: the
Province of Northern Sumatra. Achehnesee leader, Daud Beureh, who was granted with
unwritten promise from President Sukarno, surely felt betrayed. The province of Nothern
Sumatra eventually was split into two: the Province of Acheh and the Province of North
Sumatra. Yet the conflict was not resolve involuntarily.The distrust to the national
government, triggered resentment and even local rebellion, and conflict in Acheh had been
prolonged up to recently.
The case of Acheh clearly demonstrate, developing an entity of local government have
something to do with local identity. This was particularly so in the case of West Papua or
Irian Jaya. Idea lays behind this is that local each government serves as an anchor for the
existing the social grouping. In other words, given the fact that organizationally speaking
the state set itslef in several layers, the group confronts several choices: as many as the
state has. The layers of government which relevant in this analysis, however, is the one
which granted with autonomy.33 Wht is that so? Anchoring collective identity of the local
is not merely a matter of differentiate a collectivity from the other, but also a matter of
making it functional. Only local government which are granted with autonomy is relevant
for making the collectivity functional. There was no demand to have more Sub-Distric
government, despite the fact that this layer of government granted with a particular
territory and the Head of Sub-Disctric responsible coordinating various sectoral agencies.
State ideas A state, whether or not it is a nation state, suffer from contradiction within
itself. As Hoffman has clearly sugested, whatever institutional design the state chose, it has
to bring together peculiar relationship of monopoly, legitimacy, territory and force.34 The
New Order state did survive for more than three decades, yet it end the power in such
brutal way. The confidence in the power of the state eventually blind it selves with
problem of legitimacy. Not only state building was ineffective, its lost legitimacy in
territorial control, monopoly of resourcess (including national resources). The absence of
Suharto’s rule was perceived as opportunity to reverse the direction of Indonesian history.
Fundamental and comprehensive change, known domestically as reformsi total, was a
popular agenda. It also important to bear in mind though, the post Suharto Indonesia
essentially is period of  vacuum of predominating power which coincide with the peak of
globalization. What Indonesia has been experiencing was not merely state in legitimacy
32The five priciples are: (1) Belief into One God, (2) Just and civilized humanism, (3) The unity of Indonesia,
(4) People’s deliberation, (5) Social justice for the entire Indonesian.
33The layers of central government office which operates at local level is irrelevant.
34Hoffman, op. cit. page 47..
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deficit but also global agenda for delegitimizing state’s predomination. The idea of human
right, participation, autonomy and so forth—which represent the prevalence of liberal
thought—has been appealing alternative to state-promoted discourse such as serving the
nation, collective responsibility, and so on.
The prolification of local governments signify the participatory nature of policy-making in
Indonesia. Participatory policy-making take place not merely of any issue, but on deciding
the fate of the state. When we talk about participation, we usually mean the the state in the
position to decide whatever policy it is. We are now witnessing a participatory process in
within which the state is a subject matter to be decided. The fate of the state, whether to
proliferated or not, is decident by central government in response to local initiative or
proposal.Obviously, the policy-making at issue here is quite important since it, in turn,
affect the fate of participation itself. The proliferation of local government in Indonesia
represents the reverse of the political game in response to the crisis of legitimacy of central
government in performing  in performing a cenralized policy making.
Decentralization manifest in twofold. First, local governments are granted with a great deal
of autonomy vis a vis the central government, as new law on local government was
enacted35 and constitutional mandate was for doing so was made explicite.36 Secondly,
allowing process of proliferating local governments to take place. In this regard, there are
local nationalism—apart from national nationalism—each of them demand for recognition
and effective control over the state. The process has not been toward a new Indonesia
within which each unit of local nationality shares a confined territory up on which it
capable to exercise control over the state at a local level.
Decentralization creates a form of dispersed power. In a way, it could be seen as part of
liberal reform.37 The proliferation of local governments take place simultaneously with
other form of liberal reform establishing liberal political order embedded within the
process of globalization.
Transforming Nation-State.
Colloquially, the notion of ‘state’ referes to the idea of ‘nation-state’.who refers of
organization which monopolize the use of force—usually goes together with the idea of
nation or nationhood. Paul Gilbert even characterize nation as “a group which, ceteris
35Not long after Suharto’s step down from his Presidency, Law No. 22 of 1999 on Local Government was
enacted. Albeit retain the agenda of decentralizing the state, the Law was modified in 2004 through the
enactment of Law No. 32 of 2004.
36 Second round of Amandment of the Constitution, namely in article 18 specifically state that “Provincial
governments, Regencies and Municipalities self managing governmental affairs along with the principle of
autonomy…” and “local governmentsare granted with extensive authonomy in managing government affairs,
except otherwise specifically stated as responsibility of cenrtral government”.
37B.C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State, George Allen & Unwin, London,
1985.
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paribus, a right to independent statehood by virtue of being the kind of group it is”.38 Then
notion of nation-state implies that, state not only capable but also legitimately serve as
collective indentity of its citizens. Despite the fact that nation-state is problematicsin its
notion, it was so powerfull in blending diverse identity of its individual citizens. It even
claims to serve, and capable to gain legitimacy to act, as instrument to serve the interest of
the public.
Decolonization process following the World-War II have gave birth to numerous new
states, Including Indonesia. Institutional (legal, organizational and administrative) set up of
the newly born state were not merely inspired by, but also obsessed to reproduce,
institutional design prevailing in colonizing countries. Prominen leaders of the newly
established state, such as Sukarno took independence seriously, indeed. They even
mobilize hostility toward the colonial rule. Being a new state means to have exactly the
same institutional design of the state. The design is well-known as nation state; within
which one state contains one nation.
In many cases, there more than one kind of nationalism to exist in a partitular state
territory. For this reason, new form of nationalism—the so-called civic nationalism—was
mobilized. Along with the institutionalization of liberal democracy, the idea of citizenship
meet the requirement to let the the idea of nation-state to prevail. The point I want to make
here is that, nationalism was subject to some sort of reconstruction to make sure state to
prevail.
Under the leaderhip of President Sukarno, Indonesia seriously engaged in the process of
nation-building. The former territory of Duch colonial rule was meant to be territory of the
state. Aware of the existence of various facets of nationhood to exist within the territory,
the unifying jargon—unity in diversity—was put in place.
The nature of the problem is set by the acceptance of incomeing wave of democrasization,
which in fact operationalize the principal of liberal governance.39 Democratization was
place at top the agenda of reform. But in this regard, there one thing to bear in mind, the
notion of democracy actually refers to the idea of liberal democracy. The fact that the
reform was possible only during the state of crisis, and the main spirit of the reform was
the end authoritarian rule indicate that the state infact bound to left the decision to whoever
win public support.
Obviously, the question is how do we comprehend proses of change? The notion of reform
requires careful qualification, as it the state in fact has no control ofer it selves, let alone
over the society.  Everyone, basically is in favour to reform; but everyone have their own
definition of what the reform really is. For this reason its important to bear in mind that the
38Paul Gilbert, The Philosophy of Nationalism, Westview Press, Boulder, 1998, page 19.
39The underlying idea behind the reform has been to minimize the role of the state, including in the main
pillar of New Order government—the military and the bureaucracy. In fact, the agenda of reform was to curb
military engagement in politics and ensuring that bureaucry is led by elected officer. For this reason, general
election considered as prerequisite for furhter changing.
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notion of reform, in fact is not based on a predetermined design. It is not more than the
product or concequence of negotiation among competing groups. Can not treat the the
reform as usual notion policy process given the fact the idea of reform itself is not easy to
agree on. For the reason it is save to sugest that the direction of the change depends on the
way the public undestand the state.
The hart of the problem here is not merely the fate of the rulers. Moreover, at issue here is
not merely the fate authoritarianisme in Indonesia. Instead, the very nature of the problem
in fact the choice to establish authoritarian rule but also the basic design of the state
institution which typically framed as a nation-state.*
